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When a customer of a bank makes a deposit, the relationship created
between the bank and its customer is that of debtor and creditor; the bank
being the debtor and the customer being the creditor.! Unless the agree-
ment between the bank and its customer provides otherwise, the bank is
obligated to return the deposit to the customer upon his demand or to pay
out the deposit in accordance with the customer's order.2 The customer's
order is known as a check.'
If a bank refuses to honor a check of its customer without legal
justification, the bank may be liable to the customer for damages caused by
the refusal.4 Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), an unjus-
tified refusal to honor a check is known as wrongful dishonor.5 In this
article, the legal problems resulting from such wrongful dishonors will be
analyzed.
* This article is based on a thesis submitted to the University of Illinois in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws.
** Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa; B.A.,
Friends University, 1961; J.D., University of Tulsa, 1970; LL.M., University of
Illinois, 1976.
1. 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 9, § 1 (perm. ed. 1973).
2. Id. at 11.
3. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b) (All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are to
the 1972 official text unless otherwise indicated.); 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND
BANKING ch. 9, § 100, at 276 (perm. ed. 1973).
4. U.C.C. § 4-402; H. BAILEY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS § 12.3 (4th ed.
1969).
5. U.C.C. § 4-402.
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II. WHAT CONSTITUTES DISHONOR
Before considering which dishonors are wrongful, it is necessary to
determine what constitutes dishonor. The U.C.C. provides:
(1) An instrument is dishonored when
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and
due acceptance or payment is refused or cannot be ob-
tained within the prescribed time or in case of bank
collections the instrument is seasonably returned by the
midnight deadline (Section 4-301); or
(b) presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly
accepted or paid. 6
Essentially, section 3-507(1) provides that the refusal by a bank to pay a
check is a dishonor of the check. An Official Comment to the U.C.C. lists
some reasons for refusing payment which constitute dishonor: "Not suffi-
cient funds," "Account garnisheed," "No account," and "Payment
stopped. 7 A check is also dishonored when payment is refused because the
check is drawn against uncollected funds.'
Despite the broad language of section 3-507(1), every refusal to pay a
check does not constitute dishonor. The U.C.C. specifically provides that
"[r]eturn of an instrument for lack of proper indorsement is not dishon-
or."9 Because of the nature of the bank-customer relationship, the return
of a check for proper indorsement should not be a dishonor. The bank's
obligation is to pay in accordance with the order of its customer.1 ° If a
check was paid which was not properly indorsed, the bank might be paying
contrary to the order of its customer. Therefore, the return of a check is
not a refusal to honor a proper order, but is merely an indication that the
order is not in proper form." Similarly, where the amount of the check
shown in figures differs from the amount shown in words, return of the
check for correction should not be dishonor.' If the bank pays the check, it
runs the risk of paying contrary to the order of its customer. The return of
such a check is only an indication that the order is not in proper form.
A bank's refusal to certify 3 a check generally is not considered dishon-
or. Under the U.C.C., absent contrary agreement, a bank is not obligated to
certify a check. 4 The rationale for this rule is that the customer has
ordered payment on demand and not certification.' 5 Because there is no
6. Id. § 3-507(1).
7. Id. § 3-510, Comment 2.
8. Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968); Gallinaro v.
Fitzpatrick, 359 Mass. 6, 267 N.E.2d 649 (1971).
9. U.C.C. § 3-507(3). According to Official Comment 2, this section "states
general banking and commercial understanding."
10. 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 9, § 100 (perm. ed. 1973).
11. H. BAILEY, THE LAw OF BANK CHECKS § 12.1 (4th ed. 1969).
12. See 1 PATON'S DIGEST, Checks § 21C:3, at 1119 (1940).
13. Acceptance of a check is known as certification. U.C.C. § 3-411(1).
14. Id. § 3-411(2).




obligation to certify a check, the mere refusal to certify should not be a
dishonor.16 However, if the bank's refusal to certify is based on some
reason other than the absence of an obligation to certify, e.g., the check is
drawn against uncollected funds, then the refusal to certify is a dishonor.'7
The return of a check for the reason that it is postdated is not a
dishonor. A check is payable on demand, 8 but demand can be made only
after the date stated on the check. 9 Payment of a postdated check prior to
that date would be contrary to the order of the customer. Thus, a bank has
no obligation to honor a postdated check prior to its stated date and does
not dishonor the check by refusing to pay it until that date." The refusal to
pay indicates only that the customer's order is not yet effective. Similarly,
the return of a stale check2 is not a dishonor. Section 4-404 of the U.C.C.
provides that a bank is not obligated to pay a check which has been
outstanding for more than six months. When a bank refuses to pay a stale
check, it indicates only that the check is no longer a proper order because
of the long period of time elapsed since the check was drawn.
An Official Comment to the U.C.C. lists other reasons for refusing
payment which do not result in dishonor: "Signature missing," "Signature
illegible," "Forgery," "Payee altered," "Date altered," and "Not on us."22
These reasons for refusing payment indicate that the check is not in proper
form or that it is not the proper order of a customer of the bank. When a
bank refuses to pay such a check, it is not refusing to honor a proper order.
Therefore, there is no dishonor.23
In some circumstances, dishonor may result from the bank's response
to inquiries concerning a check. In Allen v. Bank of America24 the bank
received a telegram reading "Advise if Lt. W.C. Allen check $25 good. 25
Responding to the telegram, the bank wired that Allen had no account with
the bank. The court recognized that the bank could have treated the
telegram as an improper presentment and could have required actual
delivery of the check to the bank. The court held, however, that the bank
had in effect refused payment of the check for a reason other than improp-
er presentment when it responded that Allen had no account. The court
stated that after the bank's response, it would have been an idle act for the
holder of the check to deliver it to the bank. The bank's action, therefore,
amounted to a waiver of its rights and constituted a dishonor of the
16. Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928).
17. Gallinaro v. Fitzpatrick, 359 Mass. 6, 267 N.E.2d 649 (1971).
18. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b).
19. Id. § 3-114(2).
20. See Smith v. Maddox-Rucker Banking Co., 8 Ga. App. 288, 68 S.E. 1092
(1910); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1301 (1961).
21. A check which has been outstanding for more than six months is known as
a stale check. U.C.C. § 4-404, Comment.
22. Id. § 3-510, Comment 2.
23. H. BAILEY, THE LAw OF BANK CHECKS § 12.1 (4th ed. 1969).
24. 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943).
25. Id. at 126, 136 P.2d at 347.
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check.26 Although the telegram inquiry was not a demand for payment, it is
unlikely that the holder of a check would present it once he had been
advised that the drawer had no account with that bank. The court correctly
held that the bank had waived presentment and that such a reply to an
inquiry should be treated as a dishonor.
On the other hand, a response to inquiries about a check will not
always be treated as a dishonor. In Kirby v. Bergfield27 the court held that a
telephone inquiry to the drawee bank to determine whether the drawer
had sufficient funds in his account to cover a check was not a proper
presentment. Therefore, the statement of a bank employee that there were
not sufficient funds was not a dishonor.2' The decision in Kirby was correct
because the telephone inquiry was not a demand for payment; dishonor
normally does not occur without a demand for payment. Furthermore, a
disclosure of insufficient funds is less likely to preclude a subsequent
presentment of the check than is a disclosure that the drawer has no
account. The drawer of the insufficient funds check might have sufficient
funds at a later time. However, the court's indication that a check cannot be
presented by telephone was erroneous. Presentment is nothing more than
a demand for payment, 29 and it is immaterial where or how the demand is
made.30 A demand for payment made by telephone is permissible, but the
bank has a right to require production of a check at the bank"' during
banking hours if it so desires.3 2
Unless it contains a specific demand for payment, a mere inquiry
about a check may not amount to a presentment.3 However, the bank's
response to the inquiry may implicitly waive presentment 4 and effectively
dishonor the check.35 Therefore, under almost all circumstances, a bank
should refuse to answer an inquiry unless there is an express demand for
payment which then gives the bank the right to require production of the
chec at the bank. 6 If customer relations dictate a response to the inquiry,
the bank should use caution in making the response.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES WRONGFUL DISHONOR
Once it has been established that a check has been dishonored, it is
then necessary to determine whether the dishonor was wrongful. Although
section 4-402 of the U.C.C. imposes liability on a payor bank for wrongful
dishonor, that section does not specify what constitutes wrongful dishonor.
26. Id. at 129, 136 P.2d at 348-49.
27. 186 Neb. 242, 182 N.W.2d 205 (1970).
28. Id. at 247, 182 N.W.2d at 208.
29. U.C.C. § 3-504(1).
30. Id. § 3-504, Comment 1.
31. Id. § 3-505(1)(a), -505(1)(c).
32. Id. § 3-503(4).
33. Kirby v. Bergfield, 186 Neb. 242, 182 N.W.2d 205 (1970).
34. U.C.C. § 3-511(2)(a).
35. Allen v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943).
36. U.C.C. §§ 3-504(1), 3-505(1)(a), -505(1)(c).
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Therefore, it is appropriate to consider other sources to determine which
dishonors are wrongful.
3 7
Although a bank is obligated to honor the properly drawn checks of its
customers, without an agreement to the contrary it is not obligated to
honor a check unless the customer has on deposit sufficient funds to cover
the amount of the check." Therefore, where a check is presented to a bank
when the drawer's account is insufficient, dishonor of the check because of
insufficient funds is not wrongful. Likewise, dishonor of a check because
the drawer has no deposit account with the bank is not wrongful.
3 9
Banks frequently dishonor checks due to clerical errors. When a bank
credits a deposit to the wrong account, checks of the customer who made
the deposit sometimes will be returned because of insufficient funds before
the mistake is discovered. In that circumstance, return of the checks is a
wrongful dishonor.4" In Weaver v. Grenada Bank4 1 checks of a depositor
were dishonored after the bank charged the sum of $80.00 against his
account for a check on which the figures appeared to be $80.00, but on
which the actual amount of $8.00 was correctly written. The court held that
the dishonor was wrongful. Thus, clerical error or mistake is no defense to
an action for wrongful dishonor.
42
A depositor is responsible for knowing his account balance and cannot
rely on the balance shown on the books of the bank to establish wrongful
dishonor. In Bachtel v. Bank of America43 a depositor withdrew cash of
$4,300.00 after being informed by the bank that his balance was slightly
more than $5,000.00. The depositor failed to inform the bank of checks
totaling $4,297.94 previously drawn against the account and outstanding at
37. Id. § 1-103.
38. H. BAILEY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS § 12.3 (4th ed. 1969); 5A MICHIE
ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 9, § 167 (perm. ed. 1973); 1 PATON'S DIGEST, Checks §
21, at 1112 (1940). "'Properly payable' includes the availability of funds for pay-
ment at the time of decision to pay or dishonor." U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(i).
39. U.C.C. § 4-402, Comment 2.
40. Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548 (1911)
(deposit for account of Joseph H. Spearing credited to account of J. Zach Spearing
resulting in dishonor of four checks of Joseph H. Spearing); Harvey v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 906 (Mich. C.P. 1974) (deposit for checking
account credited to savings account); Grenada Bank v. Lester, 126 Miss. 442, 89 So.
2 (1921) (deposit for William Lester credited to account of Will V. Lester); Crites &
Crites v. Security State Bank, 52 Mont. 121, 155 P. 970 (1916); Nealis v. Industrial
Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (bank
credited deposit for attorney account to the personal account of the depositor
resulting in dishonor of check drawn on the attorney account); Wilson v. Palmetto
Nat'l Bank, 113 S.C. 508, 101 S.E. 841 (1920) (Depositor had an account with a
balance of $1.00. When he deposited $100.00, a new account was opened. Upon
presentation of a check for $27.00, the bookkeeper looked at the account with a
balance of $1.00, and the check was dishonored.).
41. 180 Miss. 876, 179 So. 564 (1938).
42. Atlanta Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895); Spearing v.
Whitney-Central Natl Bank, 129 La. 607, 613, 56 So. 548, 551 (1911).
43. 127 Cal. App. 2d 728, 274 P.2d 421 (1954).
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the time the bank disclosed his balance of $5,000.00. The court held that
the depositor, not the bank, was responsible for the return of the outstand-
ing checks; the depositor should have known the status of his own account.
In Turbitt v. Riggs National Bank44 a depositor requested his balance from
the bank after the deposit of another customer mistakenly had been cred-
ited to his account. Before the error was discovered, the depositor wrote
checks which exceeded his actual balance. After the error was corrected,
some of the checks were dishonored because of insufficient funds. The
court held that the dishonors were not wrongful because the depositor
should have known the correct balance of his account.
When two or more checks drawn on the account of a depositor are
presented for payment at the same time, the bank is not obligated to pay all
of the checks if the total amount of the checks exceed the balance in the
account of the depositor.45 In these circumstances, the bank may select
which checks are to be paid and which are to be dishonored in any manner
convenient to the bank.46 Because the depositor properly should have
funds available to pay all of the checks, he cannot claim that one of the
checks dishonored should have been paid instead of one that was hon-
ored.47 Therefore, in selecting which checks to dishonor, the bank does not
risk making a wrongful dishonor. In Merchant v. Worley48 a draft payable to
a third party and checks given to the bank in payment of indebtedness
owed to the bank were presented for payment on the same day. The
depositor's account was insufficient to pay all of the items, so the bank paid
the checks and dishonored the draft. Relying on section 4-303(2), the court
held that the dishonor of the draft was not wrongful.49
If a bank pays a postdated check prior to the date stated on the check,
the customer's balance may be reduced to the extent that other checks will
be dishonored because of insufficient funds. In Smith v. Maddox-Rucker
Banking Co.5° the court indicated that a dishonor under these circum-
stances was wrongful. It is proper to impose liability on a bank which causes
dishonor of a customer's checks by prematurely charging a postdated
check against the account of the customer. It is likely that the customer
postdated the check because he did not anticipate having sufficient funds
to cover the check prior to its date. Such premature payment by the bank is
contrary to the order of its customer and further results in the dishonor of
other orders of the customer.
44. 182 A.2d 886 (D.C. 1962).
45. Authorities cited note 38 supra.
46. U.C.C. § 4-403(2); Andrews v. Citizens Bank, 139 Ga. App. 763, 229
S.E.2d 501 (1976) (holding unclear).
47. U.C.C. § 4-303(2), Comment 6.
48. 79 N.M. 771, 449 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1969).
49. Cf. U.C.C. § 4-303, Comment 6. "Under subsection (2) the bank obviously
has the right to pay items for which it is itself liable ahead of those for which it is
not."
50. 8 Ga. App. 288, 68 S.E. 1092 (1910).
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Payment of a stale check by a bank could result in the dishonor of
other checks because of insufficient funds. Although a bank is not ob-
ligated to honor a stale check, it may honor the check if it does so in good
faith." Therefore, if the payment of the stale check is made in good faith,
the dishonor of other checks because of the resulting insufficient funds
should not be wrongful.
When a customer deposits a check drawn on a bank other than the
depositary bank 2 and receives immediate credit for the check, the custom-
er has no right to immediate withdrawal of the credit given. Unless there is
an agreement otherwise, the credit does not become available for with-
drawal as of right until the bank receives final settlement and has had a
reasonable time to learn of the final settlement. 5 Where a check drawn by
the customer is presented to the bank prior to the time that the credit
becomes available for withdrawal as of right, the check is drawn against
uncollected funds.5 4 Since the customer has no right to draw against uncol-
lected funds, dishonor of a check which is drawn against uncollected funds
is not wrongful.55 However, dishonor of a check for the reason that it is
drawn against uncollected funds is wrongful if enough time has elapsed so
that the funds are no longer uncollected. 56 In Bank of Louisville Royal v.
Sims57 a clerk of the bank inadvertently placed a ten-day hold against a
check deposited by Sims; the normal hold was three days. During the
extended hold period, two checks drawn by Sims were dishonored for the
reason that they were drawn against uncollected funds. The court held the
dishonors to be wrongful.
Under certain circumstances, a bank has a right of setoff against the
deposit account of its customer for amounts owed the bank by the custom-
er.5 8 When a bank exercises its right of setoff, the account balance of its
depositor could be reduced to the extent that a subsequent check would be
dishonored because of insufficient funds.59 If the bank has a legal right to
make the setoff, the subsequent dishonor for insufficient funds is not
wrongful.6" On the other hand, if the setoff is improper and results in a
51. U.C.C. § 4-404.
52. "'Depositary bank' means the first bank to which an item is transferred for
collection. . . ." Id. § 4-105(a).
53. Id. § 4-213(4)(a). For a check drawn on the depositary bank, the customer
has a right to withdraw the credit on the second banking day after deposit of the
check. Id. § 4-213(4)(b).
54. Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968); Merchant v.
Worley, 79 N.M. 771, 449 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1969).
55. Merchant v. Worley, 79 N.M 771,773,449 P.2d 787,789 (Ct. App. 1969).
56. Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).
57. Id.
58. 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 9, § 114 (perm. ed. 1973).
59. State Bank v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924); Farmers
Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975); Svendsen v.
State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896); Keller v. Commercial Credit Co.,
149 Or. 372, 40 P.2d 1018 (1935).
60. Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa
1977]
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dishonor due to insufficient funds, that dishonor is wrongful.6 In Ameri-
can Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick6 2 the bank set off a note due
from Henry against Flick's account. The loan evidenced by the note was
made to Henry to be used for the purchase of an automobile from Flick.
Flick received the proceeds, but the sale was not completed. Because the
sale was not finalized, Flick was obliged to return the funds to Henry, and
Flick claimed that he had done so. However, Flick was not obliged to repay
Henry's loan to the bank. The setoff exercised by the bank was improper.
After the setoff, three checks drawn by Flick were returned because of
insufficient funds. Because the setoff was improper, the dishonor of the
checks was wrongful.
Under the U.C.C. a setoff as to a particular check is improper after the
bank has certified the check,6" finally paid the check,64 evidenced its deci-
sion to pay the check,65 or become accountable for the check because of
making a late return of it. 6 Once one of these events has occurred,
dishonor of the check for the reason that the bank has exercised a setoff is
wrongful.
When a person other than the depositor claims an interest in the funds
in the depositor's account, the bank is placed in a difficult situation. Where
the claim is valid, the bank may be liable to the claimant if it disregards the
claim and allows its depositor to withdraw the funds.67 On the other hand,
if the bank refuses to honor the depositor's checks because the funds have
been paid to the claimant, that dishonor is wrongful if the claim proves to
be invalid.6" The bank is under a duty to hold the funds for a reasonable
period of time to allow commencement of legal proceedings by the claim-
1975) (bank properly set off notes where acceleration of maturity was made in good
faith); Mt. Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Green, 99 Ky. 262, 35 S.W. 911 (1896) (setoff had
not been exercised, but the bank had a lien against the deposit balance of its
depositor arising from a past due debt which justified dishonor of the depositor's
check); Keller v. Commercial Credit Co., 149 Or. 372, 40 P.2d 1018 (1935) (bank
properly exercised right of setoff where collateral was not what it purported to be).
61. State Bank v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924) (bank dishon-
ored several checks after applying deposit to a debt not yet due at a time when the
depositor was not insolvent); Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 P.
698 (1927) (bank charged depositor's account with a note not yet due at a time when
he was not insolvent); Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896)
(bank mistakenly thought that note charged to customer's account was due).
62. 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839 (1969).
63. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a).
64. Id. §§ 4-213(1), 4-303(1)(b) to -303(1)(e).
65. Id. § 4-303(1)(d).
66. Id. §§ 4-302, 4-303(1)(e).
67. Goldstein v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 459 F.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, 62 F. Supp. 805,810 (N.D. Iowa 1945); 5A MICHIE ON
BANKS AND BANKING ch. 9, § 82, at 243 (perm. ed. 1973).
68. Patterson v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 A. 632 (1889) (two
opinions). The dishonor is not wrongful if the funds belong to the claimant. Hanna
v. Drovers' Nat'l Bank, 194 Ill. 252, 62 N.E. 556 (1901); France Milling Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 138 App. Div. 645, 122 N.Y.S. 736 (1910).
[Vol. 42
WRONGFUL DISHONORS
ant,69 so it should not be wrongful to dishonor the depositor's checks
during this period. However, the bank must assume the risk of determin-
ing what is a reasonable period of time.70 The bank also is responsible for
showing the proper reason for dishonor, i.e., that the account is being held
because of an adverse claim.
71
To alleviate the situation caused by conflicting claims to bank deposits,
many states have adopted adverse claim statutes.72 The adverse claim
statutes generally provide that a bank is not required to recognize an
adverse claim unless the claimant secures a court order, furnishes an
indemnity bond, or, in the case of a deposit by a fiduciary, furnishes an
affidavit showing reasonable cause to believe that the fiduciary is about to
misappropriate the deposit.7" Where the claimant has complied with an
adverse claim statute and had his claim recognized by the bank, dishonor of
the depositor's checks will not be wrongful.
74
Other situations involving third parties may result in wrongful dishon-
ors. In Winkler v. Citizens' State Bank71 the cashier of the bank thought that
the depositor's funds should be paid to a third party pursuant to an
agreement between the depositor and the third party. However, the bank
had not agreed to hold the deposit for the third party; nor was the bank
under any legal obligation to protect the third party's interests. Therefore,
the bank's refusal to pay a check drawn by the depositor for the entire
amount of the deposit was wrongful. The bank in Pascagoula National Bank
v. Eberlein7' believed that a part of the funds in the wife's account had come
from the sale of the husband's business and paid the deposit into court on a
garnishment proceeding against the husband only. The subsequent dis-
honor of the wife's checks drawn on the account was held to be wrongful.
The payment of a check over a stop payment order also may result in
the dishonor of other checks because of insufficient funds. When a dishon-
or is caused by a payment made contrary to an order of the depositor, the
dishonor is normally wrongful. However, because of special rules applica-
ble to stop orders, there is some doubt whether the dishonor caused by
payment of a check over a stop order is always wrongful.
69. Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, 62 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Iowa 1945).
70. 2 PATON'S DIGEST, Deposits § 6:3, at 1657 (1940).
71. Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600
(1921) (The dishonor was wrongful where the returned checks showed "account
closed." According to the cashier, the bookkeeper had been instructed to return
them showing "account held.").
72. 2 PATON'S DIGEST, Deposits § 6:3, at 1657 (1940). For a list of states, see Id.
§ 6:3 (1940 & Supp. 1957).
73. The statute recommended by the American Bankers Association is print-
ed in 2 PATON'S DIGEST, Deposits § 6:3, at 1657-58 (1940).
74. Goldstein v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 459 F.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf.
Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 47 Misc. 2d
741, 746, 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 359 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd mem., 267 N.Y.S.2d 477
(App. Div. 1966).
75. 89 Kan. 279, 131 P. 597 (1913).
76. 161 Miss. 337, 131 So. 812 (1931).
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Under section 4-403(3) of the U.C.C., the depositor has the burden of
establishing that he incurred a loss because of a payment contrary to a stop
order. If the check is negotiated to a holder in due course, the drawer
remains liable to the holder in due course despite defenses that might be
available against the payee. 77 Because the depositor will be required to pay
the holder in due course, he suffers no loss as to that check when the bank
pays the check contrary to a stop order. 7' The bank is specifically sub-
rogated to the rights of the holder in due course.79 Using similar reasoning,
Professor Leary concluded:
If the bank can establish the payee was really owed the money, or
that the item was presented on behalf of a holder in due course,
then the customer cannot establish that he suffered any loss by the
payment, and cannot claim, further, that additional checks were
improperly dishonored causing further loss. On the other hand,
should the customer establish that as between himself and the
payee, he, the drawer, was entitled to the money and that there is
no holder in due course involved, then it would seem to follow
that he has suffered loss and the dishonor of other items, caused
by the improper debit, will be an element of the damages.80
Though not expressly stated, Professor Leary's view makes a check
subject to a stop order properly payable when negotiated to a holder in due
course. As to that particular check, the result can be justified because the
depositor could ultimately be required to pay the check. However, as to
other checks dishonored due to insufficient funds resulting from the
payment over a stop order, the result is more difficult to justify. Had the
bank stopped payment as it was ordered, the customer might be required
to pay the amount of the check to a holder in due course, but sufficient
funds would remain in the customer's account to honor the other checks-
checks which the customer may have written in anticipation that the stop
order would be honored. Because the dishonor resulted from an improper
payment by the bank, it is appropriate to treat the dishonor as wrongful
and to permit the depositor to recover damages for the bank's wrongful
act.
IV. DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISHONOR
Once it has been established that the dishonor of a check was wrong-
ful, the bank is liable to the customer for the damages resulting from the
injury caused by the wrongful dishonor. The nature and extent of the
injuries caused by wrongful dishonors and the damages recoverable there-
for will be analyzed in this section.
77. U.C.C. § 3-305.
78. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp.
790 (D. Mass. 1958).
79. U.C.C. § 4-407(a).
80. Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 15 U. PITr. L. REv. 565, 581 (1954).
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A. The Presumption of Substantial Damages
Under the common law rule, a merchant or trader was allowed to
recover substantial damages for wrongful dishonor without proof of actual
damages.8 ' The rule usually was based on the theory that dishonor of the
check of a merchant or trader involved an imputation of insolvency, dis-
honesty, or bad faith and thus slandered him in his trade or business.8 2 The
rule also was supported on the ground that the dishonor necessarily result-
ed in an impairment of the credit of the merchant or trader and that the
impairment of credit constituted a substantial injury for which he was
entitled to recover more than nominal damages.8 3 Due to the difficulty in
proving special or actual damages, the courts presumed substantial dam-
ages, the amount to be determined by the trier of fact. 4 One court held
that the presumption was conclusive.
8 5
In some jurisdictions, if the depositor was not a merchant or trader,
his recovery for wrongful dishonor was limited to nominal damages unless
he pleaded and proved special or actual damages; there was no presump-
tion of injury to credit or reputation. 6 In other jurisdictions, however,
depositors were entitled to substantial damages8 7 without proof of actual
damages and without regard to whether a depositor was a merchant or
trader.8 Because the extent of the injury and the amount of damage
caused by the injury were often difficult to establish, substantial damages
were based upon a presumption that dishonor results in some injury to the
credit of the depositor.89 Substantial damages also were allowed where
81. McFall v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Ark. 370,211 S.W. 919 (1919); Schaffner v.
Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891); Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65
N.W. 1086 (1896); Crites & Crites v. Security State Bank, 52 Mont. 121, 155 P. 970
(1916); Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 P. 462 (1922).
82. McFall v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Ark. 370, 374, 211 S.W. 919, 921 (1919);
Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 113, 28 N.E. 917, 919 (1891); Svendsen v. State
Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896); Crites & Crites v. Security State Bank, 52
Mont. 121, 155 P. 970 (1916).
83. Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 P. 462 (1922).
84. Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 114,28 N.E. 917,919 (1891); Browning
v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 P. 462 (1922).
85. First Nat'l Bank v. N.R. McFall & Co., 144 Ark. 149, 222 S.W. 40 (1920).
86. Third Nat'l Bank v. Ober, 178 F. 678, 680 (8th Cir. 1910); First Nat'l Bank
v. Stewart, 204 Ala. 199, 85 So. 529 (1920); Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l
Bank, 129 La. 607, 613, 56 So. 548, 550 (1911).
87. Substantial damages are often characterized as reasonable damages, Val-
ley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 501, 121 P.2d 414,419 (1942); Grenada Bank
v. Lester, 126 Miss. 442, 89 So. 2 (1921); or temperate damages, Hilton v. Jesup
Banking Co., 128 Ga. 30, 57 S.E. 78 (1907) (temperate damages equivalent to
moderate or reasonable damages); Atlanta Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E.
190 (1895); Wilson v. Palmetto Nat'l Bank, 113 S.C. 508, 101 S.E. 841 (1920).
88. Hilton v. Jesup Banking Co., 128 Ga. 30, 57 S.E. 78 (1907); Atlanta Nat'l
Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895); Grenada Bank v. Lester, 126 Miss.
442, 89 So. 2 (1921); Patterson v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 A. 632 (1889)
(Case II); Wilson v. Palmetto Nat'l Bank, 113 S.C. 508, 101 S.E. 841 (1920).
89. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 500, 121 P.2d 414, 418-19
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there was some evidence of injury to the credit of the depositor, but the
extent of the injury (specific amount of damages caused by the injury) was
not proved.90
Seeking to change the rule that allowed substantial damages without
proof of actual damages, many states enacted a statute identical or similar
to a model statute recommended by the American Bankers Association
(A.B.A.).91 The A.B.A. model statute provided:
No bank or trust company doing business in this State shall be
liable to a depositor because of the non-payment through mistake
or error and without malice of a check which should have been
paid unless the depositor shall allege and prove actual damage by
reason of such non-payment and in such event the liability shall
not exceed the amount of damage so proved.92
The A.B.A. sponsored the statute because the rule allowing substantial
damages without proof of actual damages was considered to be unjust to
banks." A portion of an A.B.A. statement sets out the reason for the
statute:
The courts proceed on the theory that the dishonor of [a
depositor's] check must necessarily result in material injury to
such drawer and therefore hold that the law will conclusively
presume such to be the fact without the necessity of any proof
thereof. But the fact is often contrary to the presumption and
probably in the majority of instances where a customer's check is
refused payment through error, the mistake is promptly correct-
ed, an explanatory letter is written by the banker and no actual
damage results to the customer. The application of the rule,
therefore, works an injustice to the bank which is often mulcted in
dama es out of all proportion to the imaginary injury inflicted
Section 4-402 of the U.C.C. has a provision similar to the A.B.A.
statute which provides in part:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximate-
ly caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor
occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual damages
proved.
The purpose of this portion of section 4-402 is similar to the purpose of the
A.B.A. statute. Comment 3 to section 4-402 states this purpose as follows:
This section rejects decisions which have held that where the
(1942); Atlanta Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895); Meinhart v.
Farmers' State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 338, 259 P. 698, 701 (1927).
90. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 503, 121 P.2d 414, 419 (1942);
Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698 (1927); Johnson v.
National Bank, 213 S.C. 458, 465, 50 S.E.2d 177, 180 (1948).
91. 1 PATON'S DIGEST, Checks § 21B:1 (1940).





dishonored item has been drawn by a merchant, trader or
fiduciary he is defamed in his business, trade or profession by a
reflection on his credit and hence that substantial damages may be
awarded on the basis of defamation "per se" without proof that
damage has occurred. The merchant, trader and fiduciary are
placed on the same footing as any other drawer and in all cases of
dishonor by mistake damages recoverable are limited to those
actually proved.
Prior to the A.B.A. statute, the rule of substantial damages was often
applied to situations where wrongful dishonors resulted from mistake.95
Unquestionably, the purpose of both the A.B.A. statute and section 4-402
was to eliminate the presumption of substantial damage where the wrong-
ful dishonor resulted from the bank's mistake. However, the language of
section 4-402 suggests that it does not apply to all wrongful dishonors:
"When the dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual
damages proved."96 This language implies that liability would not be lim-
ited to actual damages if the dishonor was for a reason other than mistake.
Similar language was contained in the A.B.A. statute.
97
This actual damage limitation has not been applied to all wrongful
dishonors. In Jones v. Citizens Bank98 the court held that a statute similar to
the A.B.A. model was not applicable to a wrongful dishonor which was
maliciously made. Considering a similar statute in Woody v. National
Bank,99 the court held the statute not applicable when the dishonor was
alleged to be willful and malicious. In Loucks v. Albuquerque National
Bank'00 the court indicated that section 4-402 applies only to dishonors
resulting from mistake. In Loucks the bank charged to a partnership
account the note of an individual partner. The bank argued that it acted
under a mistaken belief that the proceeds of the loan could be traced to the
partnership. However, the bank dishonored partnership checks after being
informed that the note was a personal obligation and that the partnership
had outstanding checks. The court held that it was a jury question whether
the checks were dishonored due to mistake. Likewise, in Northshore Bank v.
Palmer'0 ' the court upheld a recovery of exemplary damages after a jury
finding that the dishonor was not the result of mistake.
95. Hilton v. Jesup Banking Co., 128 Ga. 30, 57 S.E. 78 (1907) (mistake of
cashier); Atlanta Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895) (mistake of
employee); Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891) (bookkeeping
mistake); Grenada Bank v. Lester, 126 Miss. 442, 89 So. 2 (1921) (credit of deposit
to wrong account); Crites & Crites v. Security State Bank, 52 Mont. 121, 155 P. 970
(1916) (credit of deposit to wrong account); Wilson v. Palmetto Nat'l Bank, 113 S.C.
508, 101 S.E. 841 (1920) (mistake of employee).
96. U.C.C. § 4-402.
97. 1 PATON'S DIGEST, Checks § 21B:1, at 1117 (1940).
98. 58 N.M. 48, 50, 265 P.2d 366, 368 (1954).
99. 194 N.C. 549, 556, 140 S.E. 150, 154 (1927).
100. 76 N.M. 735, 745, 418 P.2d 191, 198 (1966).
101. 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
1977]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
If the actual damage limitation of section 4-402 applies only to wrong-
ful dishonors resulting from mistake, the presumption of substantial dam-
ages, to the extent it was the rule under prior law, remains a valid rule for
wrongful dishonors not resulting from mistake. Therefore, the question of
mistake is crucial to the determination of damages from wrongful dis-
honor.
There has long been a distinction between mistaken and willful dis-
honors in New York. In Wildenberger v. Ridgewood National Bank02 the
bank dishonored checks of a depositor after his wife asserted a claim to
one-half of the funds on deposit. Discussing damages, Justice Cardozo
stated:
The dishonor of the checks was admittedly a wrong. The wrong, if
willful, charged the bank with liability for the consequences. In
many jurisdictions the liability is the same whether the wrong is
willful or merely heedless. In this state the liability is for nominal
damages and no more, if the dishonor of the checks is the result of
innocent mistake. That was the situation in Clark Co. v. Mt.
Morris Bank, 85 App. Div. 362, 83 N.Y. Supp. 447, and 181 N.Y.
533, 73 N.E. 1133, where dishonor was due to the blunder of a
bookkeeper, who misread the plaintiff's balance. Sometimes we
are told that, to permit the recovery of substantial damages, the
wrong must be malicious. This does not mean, however, that it
must be the product of hatred or malevolence. It is the exclusion
of liability for the consequences of accident or mistake. We find
nothing of accident or mistake in the defendant's dishonor of
these checks. It dishonored them with full knowledge of the state
of the account, setting one risk against another, the risk of adverse
claims against the risk of broken contracts. Here was no heedless
act, but one deliberate and willful. 10 3
A similar distinction was made in Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank. °4 In
Meinhart the dishonor was held to be intentional, rather than mistaken,
where the bank charged a depositor's note against his account at a time
when the note was not due.
In Northshore Bank v. Palmer'0 5 depositor Palmer's account was charged
with a check purportedly indorsed and cashed by Palmer. Despite Palmer's
protestations that the indorsement was not his and that he had not received
the proceeds of the check, the bank dishonored checks \which it had
previously paid indicating that they had been paid in error. The court
found that the bank's actions were deliberate, intentional, and done with
knowledge of the depositor's assertions that the bank's actions were
wrongful.
Applying the reasoning set out in Palmer, Wildenberger, and Meinhart,
102. 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921).
103. Id. at 427-28, 130 N.E. at 600.
104. 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698 (1927).
105. 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
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wrongful dishonors resulting from inadvertent bookkeeping errors and
other unintentional employee errors would be mistaken dishonors. On the
other hand, where a dishonor is caused by a setoff or charge made by a
bank under an erroneous belief that it had a legal right to do so, the
wrongful dishonor resulting from the improper setoff or charge would not
be classified as mistaken. Under this test, the wrongful dishonor in Loucks
v. Albuquerque National Bank,'10 6 which resulted from an improper setoff,
would not be a mistaken dishonor.
Except for the allowance of nominal damages by some courts, court
decisions under statutes similar to the A.B.A. model have been consistent
with the act. In Bush v. Southwark National Bank °7 the court held that a
statute similar to the A.B.A. model abrogated the presumption of substan-
tial damage for wrongful dishonor and required proof of actual damage.
Further, the court held that because of the statute, the depositor was not
entitled to nominal damages since he had not proven any actual damages.
Relying on a statute similar to the A.B.A. model, the court in Thomas v.
American Trust Co.'1 8 stated that a depositor was entitled only to actual
damages for a wrongful dishonor resulting from mistake. However, con-
trary to the statute, the court indicated that the depositor would be entitled
to nominal damages if he failed to prove actual damages. In State Bank v.
Marshall"9 the depositor was entitled to recover only nominal damages
under a statute which limited recovery for wrongful dishonor to special
damages proved. However, the result likely would have been the same
without the statute because the court held that the depositor was not a
merchant or trader; thus he would not have had the benefit of the pre-
sumption -of substantial damages. Likewise, in First National Bank v. Du-
cros n ° the court cited a statute similar to the A.B.A.,model, but the depositor
would have been entitled only to nominal damages since he was not a
merchant or trader. In Abramowitz v. Bank of America"' the court relied on
a similar statute in stating that the depositor would be limited to actual
damages, but found that the depositor had established actual damages.
Similarly, in Weaver v. Bank of America" 2 the court found that actual
damages had been alleged.
Some decisions under section 4-402 have been consistent with the
language and purpose of the section. Following section 4-402, the court in
Continental Bank v. Fitting'13 reversed an award of damages for a mistaken
dishonor where no specific damages as a result of the dishonor had been
106. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
107. 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (Phila. County C.P. 1926).
108. 208 N.C. 653, 182 S.E. 136 (1935).
109. 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924).
110. 27 Ala. App. 193, 168 So. 704 (1936).
111. 131 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 892, 281 P.2d 380 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1955).
112. 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
113. 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); accord, Harvey v. Michi-
gan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 906 (Mich. C.P. 1974) (the court refused to
allow the jury to consider an award of damages for defamation per se).
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established. In Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank114 the requirement that the
depositor prove actual damages was recognized, and the court found that
actual damages had been established. Likewise, in Bank of Louisville Royal v.
Sims1 15 the court acknowledged the actual damage provision of section 4-
402 but held that several items of the alleged damages did not constitute
actual damages.
Language from other decisions under section 4-402 has been some-
what contrary to the language and purpose of the section. In American
Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick"16 the court stated:
[W]e hold that when a bank wrongfully dishonors its custom-
er's business check there arises a presumption that the customer's
credit and business standing is thereby harmed. The function of
this presumption is to remove from the customer the duty of
going forward with the evidence on this particular injury or harm
and thereby avoid a directed verdict against him if evidence on the
issue is not produced. The primary reason for the recognition of
this presumption is that a wrongful dishonor renders the exist-
ence of some harm to the customer's credit and business standing
so probable that it makes legal sense as well as common sense to
assume the existence of such harm unless and until the adversary
comes forward with some evidence to the contrary.
Despite this presumption, the depositor's recovery was limited to nominal
damages because the court did not also presume that substantial damages
resulted from the presumed injury. The evidence was held to be insuffi-
cient to establish that a decline in the depositor's business for which he
claimed substantial damages was proximately caused by the wrongful dis-
honor.
Although the dishonor in Flick resulted from a setoff and not a
mistake and thus was not subject to the actual damages provision of section
4-402, the presumption recognized by the court was not limited to mistak-
en dishonors. Since the court refused to presume substantial damages, the
presumption does not seriously conflict with the purpose of section 4-402.
However, a presumption of injury is not a necessity. If a depositor can
establish damages, he should be able to establish the injury which caused
the damages without the aid of a presumption. A presumption of injury
without a presumption of substantial damages results in a recovery of
nominal damages: an end inconsistent with section 4-402 which limits
recovery to actual damages. Furthermore, once a court takes the first step
of presuming injury, it might then presume substantial damages, a result in
serious conflict with section 4-402. At the least, a presumption of injury
could lead to confusion in applying the presumption to later cases and
might encourage litigation by depositors who believe the presumption
114. 407 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1969).
115. 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).




improves chances of recovery. Therefore, the presumption recognized by
the Flick court properly should be rejected by future Indiana decisions and
not be adopted by other jurisdictions.
Whether the depositor's credit had been damaged by a wrongful
dishonor was identified by the court in Loucks v. Albuquerque National
Bank" 7 as a question of fact for the jury. The court stated:
Damages recoverable for injuries to credit as a result of a
wrongful dishonor are more than mere nominal damages and are
referred to as "***compensatory, general, substantial, moderate,
or temperate, damages as would be fair and reasonable compensa-
tion for the injury which he [the depositor] must have sustained,
but not harsh or inordinate damages.***" 5A Michie, Banks and
Banking, § 243 at 576.
What are reasonable and temperate damages varies accord-
ing to the circumstances of each case and the general extent to
which it may be presumed the credit of the depositor would be
injured. Valley National Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d
414. The amount of such damages is to be determined by the
sound discretion and dispassionate judgment of the jury.
Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698, 701.
Although there was considerable evidence of injury to the depositor's
credit, the Loucks opinion does not indicate the extent of evidence on the
amount of damages resulting from that injury. Without considering any
evidence of damages, the court stated that there was a presumption that
substantial damages resulted from the injury. The court indicated that the
actual damage limitation of section 4-402 would not apply unless the
dishonor was caused by a mistake. However, the court did not state clearly
an intention to limit the presumption of substantial damages to dishonors
other than those resulting from mistake. Unless the use of the presumption
of substantial damages is precluded in the case of mistaken dishonors, the
presumption is directly contrary to the purpose of section 4-402.
Two aspects of wrongful dishonor are treated by the courts not as
separate and distinct problems, but as a single problem to be resolved by a
presumption of substantial damages. First, it is difficult to prove that the
wrongful dishonor caused injury to the depositor's credit. Second, even
with injury established, it is still difficult to prove with certainty the amount
of damages resulting from the injury.
In many cases where a presumption of substantial damages was ap-
plied, courts first presumed injury to the depositor and then allowed the
trier of fact to assess reasonable damages resulting from the presumed
injury. 8 The reason given for applying the presumption was the difficulty
117. 76 N.M. 735, 746, 418 P.2d 191, 198-99 (1966).
118. McFall v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Ark. 370, 211 S.W. 919 (1919); Atlanta
Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895); Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill.
109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891); Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086
(1896); Grenada Bank v. Lester, 126 Miss. 442, 89 So. 2 (1921); Crites & Crites v.
Security State Bank, 52 Mont. 121, 155 P. 970 (1916).
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of proof, but it is not dear whether the difficulty was in proof of injury or
in proof of the amount of damages. It seems likely that the courts had both
in mind. Where there was some evidence of injury but no proof of a
definite amount of resulting damages, the presumption of substantial
damages was used to allow the trier of fact to assess reasonable damages to
compensate the depositor for the proven injury.19 The reason given for
use of the presumption was the difficulty of proof, meaning the difficulty
in proving with certainty the amount of damages. On the other hand, in
Spearing v. Whitney-Central National Bank'20 the court refused to apply the
presumption purportedly because the depositor was not a merchant or
trader; yet the court assessed reasonable damages upon testimony that the
depositor lost credit standing with some of the payees of the dishonored
checks. Thus, it is clear that confusion existed in various jurisdictions as to
the meaning and the proper application of the presumption of substantial
damages. This confusion resulted from a failure to distinguish between
proof of injury and proof of amount of damages.
When the drafters of the A.B.A. model statute and section 4-402
sought to eliminate the presumption of substantial damages, they also
failed to distinguish between proof of injury and proof of amount of
damages. The drafters of both statutory provisions sought to eliminate the
presumption of substantial damages by limiting liability for mistaken
wrongful dishonors to actual damages proved. If the drafters intended to
preclude a presumption of injury, that should have been the language
used. If it was intended to preclude recovery of damages for an established
injury unless the amount of damages could be established with certainty,
then the language should have been more specific than "liability is limited
to actual damages proved.''
The failure of these statutory provisions to distinguish between proof
of injury and proof of amount of damages has resulted in inconsistent
decisions. In State Bank v. Marshall, 122 despite proof that credit had been
denied to the depositor as a result of the wrongful dishonors, the depositor
was allowed to recover only nominal damages because she failed to estab-
lish the amount of her damages. On the other hand, in Loucks v. Albuquer-
que National Bank, 123 where there was considerable evidence of injury to
the credii of the depositor, the court made it clear that reasonable damages
119. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942) (loss of
credit and business opportunities); Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank, 124 Kan. 333,
259 P. 698 (1927) (refusals to make loans and cash checks); Johnson v. National
Bank, 213 S.C. 458, 50 S.E.2d 177 (1948) (some direct evidence of injury to credit);
Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 P. 462 (1922) (necessary to return
purchased goods).
120. 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548 (1911).
121. U.C.C. § 4-402.
122. 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924) (statute similar to A.B.A. statute, but
requiring proof of special damages rather than actual damages).
123. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966) (there is some question whether section
4-402 is applicable to factual situation in this case).
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were to be determined by the jury without specific proof of the amount of
damages. In American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick124 the
court distinguished between proof of injury and proof of amount of
damages:
We are not unmindful that there must be drawn a clear distinction
between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that
the plaintiff sustained some harm and the measure of proof
necessary to enable the trier of fact to fix the amount to compen-
sate for such harm. And we do not preclude recovery for other
than nominal damages . . . merely because plaintiff is unable to
fix the exact amount. We recognize that the amount of damages
appropriate for harm to credit and business standing is difficult to
prove. When it is found that a harm has been caused and the only
uncertainty is as to the dollar value of the harm, there can rarely
be good reason for refusing, on account of such uncertainty, any
damages whatever. However, there must be some evidence on
which to base an award of substantial damages. 125
After making this distinction, the court held that there was a presumption
of injury to credit and business standing, but denied a recovery of substan-
tial damages because the depositor failed to present evidence that the
decline in his business was caused by the wrongful dishonors.
Unless section 4-402 is clarified by amendment, the proper interpreta-
tion of the section will remain uncertain. There is actually no need for a
presumption of injury to credit because such an injury is not difficult to
establish. In Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank126 the depositor presented
evidence that, after the dishonors, some individuals and firms who had
previously taken his checks now refused to do so and that other businesses
had denied him credit. Similarly, in Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank127 the
depositor introduced evidence that he had been denied credit because of
the dishonors. In Northshore Bank v. Palmer128 the customer presented
evidence of being denied credit for the first time. 12 9 Therefore, an amend-
ment to section 4-402 should preclude a presumption of injury to credit.
However, once injury to credit has been established, it may be quite
difficult to prove the exact dollar amount of damages resulting from the
injury.3 ° An amendment should not be too strict in specifying the degree
of proof required to establish the amount of damages with sufficient
certainty to allow recovery of more than nominal damages. Moreover, until
section 4-402 is amended, interpretation of the section will remain a prob-
124. 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839 (1969).
125. Id. at 135, 252 N.E.2d at 846-47 (citations omitted) (emphasis by the
court).
126. 76 N.M 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
127. 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698 (1927).
128. 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
129. For other cases where there was some evidence of injury, see note 119
supra.
130. American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122,
135, 252 N.E.2d 839, 847 (1969); cases cited note 119 supra.
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lem. When interpreting this section, the courts should keep in mind what
was said in Weaver v. Bank of America:13 1
The purpose of the common law presumption was to permit
substantial recovery although specific damages could not be
shown due to the difficulty of proof. If a concomitant ameliora-
tion of the standards of specificity and proof does not accompany
the repeal of the presumption, a statute designed to prevent
injustice to banks will be carried beyond the point necessary to
that end; it will, instead, inflict injustice upon the depositor.
Accordingly, section 4-402 should be interpreted to preclude a presump-
tion of injury to credit. However, once an injury has been established, the
section should not be strictly interpreted as to the degree of proof neces-
sary to establish the amount of damages.
B. Actual Damages
Section 4-402 of the U.C.C. limits liability for mistaken dishonors to
actual damages proved. It is therefore necessary to determine what consti-
tutes actual damage.
1. Injury to Credit
Proving actual injury to credit is not difficult.1 2 Proof of the amount
of damages resulting from the injury with a high degree of certainty,
however, may be quite difficult.13 3 The question is whether evidence of
injury to credit is sufficient proof of actual damages, or whether there must
be additional evidence of specific items of damage such as a loss of busi-
ness.
In Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank" 4 the court allowed the jury to
assess reasonable damages for injury to the depositor's credit where there
was eyidence of injury but no evidence of the specific elements of dam-
age. 13 In State Bank v. Marshall 31 there was evidence that the depositor
131. 59 Cal. 2d 428, 437, 380 P.2d 644, 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 11 (1963).
132. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942) (evidence of
loss of mercantile credit and business opportunities); Meinhart v. Farmers' State
Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698 (1927) (evidence of credit refusals); Spearing v.
Whitney-Central Natl Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548 (1911) (evidence of loss of
credit with payees); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191
(1966) (evidence of refusals to take depositor's checks and of refusals to extend
credit to depositor); Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975) (evidence of credit denial for first time).
133. American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122,
135, 252 N.E.2d 839, 847 (1969).
134. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966). It is possible that the rule on damages
would not be applied to a mistaken dishonor, but the court did not formulate a
different rule for mistaken dishonors.
135. Accord, Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548
(1911) (court refused to apply presumption of substantial damages, but assessed
reasonable damages on the basis of evidence of loss of credit).
136. 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924) (statute similar to A.B.A. statute;
Arkansas statute required proof of special damages rather than actual damages).
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had been denied further credit by a merchant, but had continued to buy
from the merchant by paying cash. The court held that the proof establish-
ed only inconvenience, not damage. The court indicated that in order to
prove damage it would be necessary for the depositor to show loss of
patronage at her business or inability to obtain materials or supplies.
Similarly, in Harvey v. Michigan National Bank" 7 the depositor recovered
late and service charges imposed by his mortgage company after the
wrongful dishonor of a check payable to the company. He also recovered
the cost of money orders purchased during the period that the mortgage
company refused to accept his personal checks. However, recovery was
denied for injury to credit because no other creditor learned of the dishon-
or, and the mortgage company again accepted his personal check when the
error was explained by the bank.
In American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick3' the court
reversed an award of substantial damages because the depositor failed to
establish that the decline in his business was caused by the wrongful
dishonor. However, the court did state a test to determine when damage to
credit is sufficiently established:
We recognize that the amount of damages appropriate for harm
to credit and business standing is difficult to prove. When it is
found that a harm has been caused and the only uncertainty is as
to the dollar value of the harm, there can rarely be good reason
for refusing, on account of such uncertainty, any damages what-
ever.
139
This test is consistent with the approach taken by the court in Loucks.
When determining whether actual damages have been proved, courts
should apply a standard similar to that suggested in Loucks and Flick.
Under this standard, proof of injury to the depositor's credit would consti-
tute proof of actual damages. The trier of fact would be allowed to assess a
reasonable amount as damages without required proof of a certain dollar
amount of damage resulting from the injury. If this standard is adopted, it
will be necessary for the courts to decide which factors are relevant in
arriving at reasonable damages. Although there may be others, the previ-
ous credit standing of the depositor and the number of credit denials
caused by the wrongful dishonor are two factors which would be relevant
to that determination.
2. Injury to Reputation
Construing a statute similar to the A.B.A. model, the court in Weaver v.
Bank of America140 held that actual damages include those resulting from
injury to reputation. To support its conclusion, the court relied on Mouse v.
Central Savings & Trust Co. 4' In Mouse, the court stated:
137. 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 906 (Mich. C.P. 1974).
138. 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839 (1969).
139. Id. at 135, 252 N.E.2d at 847.
140. 59 Gal. 2d 428, 437, 380 P.2d 644, 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 11 (1963).
141. 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929).
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What is actual damage? . . . "Actual damages" is a term
synonymous with compensatory damages .... Corpus Juris de-
fines the word "actual" as "real, present, visible, existent; existing
at the time; existing in fact."
What could be a more real and existing damage to a person of
good reputation than confinement in the county jail upon a
charge concededly erroneous? Such damage is actual, so real,
present, and existing, in fact, that the unlawful restraint by one
person of the physical liberty of another gives rise to a cause of
action all its own, namely, that of false arrest.
142
When called upon to construe the actual damages provision of section 4-
402, it is likely that courts will follow the Weaver and Mouse interpretation
and hold that damages resulting from injury to reputation constitute actual
damages under that section.
3. Loss of Business
The decisions under section 4-402 indicate that damages resulting
from the loss of business constitute actual damages under that section.
Applying section 4-402 in Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 43 the court
affirmed an award of damages resulting from an erroneous dishonor of
plaintiff's check. As a result of the dishonor, plaintiff's supplier of fish
refused to store fish before delivery without advance payment. Plaintiff
was thereby unable to continue sales to various hotel customers. The
recovery was based upon loss of profits projected over a three-year period.
Since the wrongful dishonor was found to be caused by the bank's mistake,
plaintiff's loss of profits apparently was considered by the court to be actual
damages within the meaning of section 4-402.
In American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick 144 the court
rejected a recovery for business losses because plaintiff failed to establish
that the losses were caused by the dishonor of his check; the evidence
indicated that the decline in business was caused by other factors. However,
the court did indicate that recovery could be had under section 4-402 for a
decline in business.
4. Mental Pain and Suffering
Recovery for mental pain and suffering has been denied by the major-
ity of the courts considering such claims. 45 However, in Weaver v. Bank of
142. Id. at 610-11, 167 N.E. at 871.
143. 407 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1969).
144. 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839 (1969).
145. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 505, 121 P.2d 414, 420 (1942)
(no recovery for mental pain and suffering such as humiliation and embarrass-
ment); Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1968) (no recovery
for embarrassment, humiliation or mortification unless punitive damages are ap-
propriate); American Nat'l Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 863, 69 S.W. 759, 760
(1902) (no recovery for humiliation or mortification of feeling if only compensatory
damages are justified); Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 906
(Mich. C.P. 1974); Grenada Bank v. Lester, 126 Miss. 442, 445, 89 So. 2, 3 (1921)
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America 146 the court held that a recovery could be had for impairment of
health caused by mental or emotional distress. Although not always ar-
ticulated in the cases, denial of recovery was likely based on the reluctance
of courts to allow recovery for mental pain and suffering without physical
injury. 47
In Meadows v. First National Bank148 the court held that damages
resulting from mental anguish or emotional disturbance were not actual
damages. However, this case was not decided under a statutory provision
similar to the A.B.A. model statute; the court applied the common law of
Texas. The court relied on State National Bank v. Rogers14 9 which had held
that there can be no recovery for mental suffering in an action for breach
of contract or in a tort action based on a right arising from a contract. 50 On
the other hand, in Weaver v. Bank of America l5 1 the court concluded that
damages resulting from impairment of health caused by mental or emo-
tional distress constituted actual damages under a statute similar to the
A.B.A. model.
Interpreting section 4-402, the court in Bank of Louisville Royal v.
Sims 52 reversed an award of damages for embarrassment, humiliation,
mortification, and illness caused by nerves. Although the court stated that
damages resulting from hurt feelings and nerves could not constitute
actual damages, it relied primarily on the decision in American National
Bank v. Morey' 53 which held that there can be no recovery for humiliation
or mortification if only compensatory damages are justified. The court in
Sims suggested that damages for mental pain and suffering might have
been recovered if the bank's actions had been willful or malicious.
At this point, the weight of authority is against the recovery of dam-
ages for mental pain and suffering in an action for wrongful dishonor.
However, the trend in other areas of the law is toward the recognition of
mental pain and suffering as an independent injury for which damages
may be recovered.' 54 The actual damages provision of section 4-402 should
be interpreted to include damages for mental pain and suffering.
(no recovery for mental pain and suffering such as humiliation and embarrassment
unless there was malice making punitive damages appropriate); Meadows v. First
Nat'l Bank, 149 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941); State Nat'l Bank v. Rogers,
89 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1935) (no recovery for mental suffering in
action arising from contract).
146. 59 Cal. 2d 428, 438, 380 P.2d 644, 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 11 (1963); accord,
Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 848, 853-54 (1975).
147. Grenada Bank v. Lester, 126 Miss. 442, 89 So. 2, 3 (1921); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 12, 54 (4th ed. 1971).
148. 149 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941).
149. 89 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 1935).
150. Id. at 827.
151. 59 Cal. 2d 428, 438, 380 P.2d 644, 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 11 (1963).
152. 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).
153. 113 Ky. 857, 69 S.W. 759 (1902).
154. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 12, 54 (4th ed. 1971).
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C. Proximate Cause
Under section 4-402, "[a] payor bank is liable to its customer for
damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item." Since
liability is limited to injuries proximately caused by a wrongful dishonor,
consideration will now be given to situations involving problems of proxi-
mate causation.
1. Arrest
The issue of proximate causation has been presented most often in
cases where the depositor sought to recover for injuries resulting from his
arrest and detention after a wrongful dishonor of his check. The arrest and
detention were based on the alleged crime of issuing a check without
sufficient funds on deposit to cover the check. Because the depositor did
have sufficient funds to cover the check, he was not guilty of a criminal act,
and the dishonor was wrongful.
In earlier cases, the wrongful dishonor was held not to be the proxi-
mate cause of the arrest and detention of the depositor.'55 The decisions in
those cases usually were based on the proposition that the act of the payee
or holder of the check in procuring the arrest of the depositor was an
independent, intervening cause of the arrest. This reasoning was stated in
Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie: 156
When defendant bank refused payment of plaintiff's check, the
natural consequence to be expected was that the person or bank
which had parted with money or something of value on the faith
of the check would immediately notify plaintiff of its dishonor and
demand payment. Is it reasonable to suppose such person or bank
would immediately procure the arrest of plaintiff under such state
of facts without some attempt, at least, to permit plaintiff to make
explanation or restitution? We answer no. Every day of every
week such mistakes occur, but arrests are not made without inves-
tigation.
More recent cases have left the question of proximate cause to the trier
of fact and have made it clear that a wrongful dishonor can be found to be
the proximate cause of the depositor's arrest. 57 It has been held that the
procurement of arrest by a third party does not necessarily break the chain
of causation. The rationale of these decisions was set out in Mouse v. Central
Savings & Trust Co.: 158
155. Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 150 P. 356 (1915),
overruled, Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1963); Bearden v. Bank of Italy, 57 Cal. App. 377, 207 P. 270 (1922), overruled,
Weaver v. Bank of America, supra; Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165,
281 S.W. 130 (1926); Western Nat'l Bank v. White, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 131 S.W.
828 (1910).
156. 220 Mo. App. 165, 170, 281 S.W. 130, 132 (1926).
157. Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1963); Collins v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 131 Conn. 167, 38 A.2d 582 (1944);
Mouse v. Central Savings & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929).
158. 120 Ohio St. 599, 605, 167 N.E. 868, 870 (1929).
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[I]t was entirely natural and probable that the act of the bank
would result in the arrest of Mouse. By the exercise of reasonable
diligence, the bank could have foreseen that this exact conse-
quence would occur, for the issuance of a check upon a bank
without funds or credit to meet it is a public offense, which,
notoriously, frequently results in the arrest and imprisonment of
the drawer of the check.
Section 4-402 adopts the position of the later cases on the question
whether a wrongful dishonor can be found to be the proximate cause of an
arrest:
If so proximately caused and proved damages may include dam-
ages for an arrest or prosecution of the customer or other conse-
quential damages. Whether any consequential damages are proxi-
mately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be
determined in each case.
Comment 5 to section 4-402 further clarifies the purpose of the section:
The fourth sentence of the section rejects decisions holding
that as a matter of law the dishonor of a check is not the "proxi-
mate cause" of the arrest and prosecution of the customer, and
leaves to determination in each case as a question of fact whether
the dishonor is or may be the "proximate cause."
It is clear, therefore, that under the U.C.C. a wrongful dishonor can be
found to be the proximate cause of the arrest of the depositor for issuing a
check with insufficient funds in his account.
2. The Code Cases
In Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank"' the court held that the
question of proximate causation was for the jury. After several of de-
positor's checks were dishonored, some businesses refused to continue
taking his checks, and others refused to extend him credit. The court held
this evidence sufficient to go to the jury to determine whether depositor's
credit had been damaged as a proximate result of the dishonors. 60 Similar-
ly, in Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank16 one of the points made by the court
was that whether a dishonor is the proximate cause of an injury to the
depositor is a question for the trier of fact. The court upheld an award of
damages for wrongful dishonor against a contention that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the claim. The decisions in Loucks and Skov are
consistent with the U.C.C. which provides that the proximate cause of
consequential damages in wrongful dishonor actions is a question of fact to
be determined in each case.
16 2
In American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick 63 the proximate
159. 76 N.M. 735, 746, 418 P.2d 191, 198 (1966).
160. Id.
161. 407 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1969).
162. U.C.C. § 4-402.
163. 146 Ind. App. 122, 136, 252 N.E.2d 839, 847 (1969).
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cause question was decided as a matter of law. In Flick there was no
evidence to show that the alleged injury was caused by the wrongful
dishonor. Hence, recovery was denied. The decision in Flick, however, was
not in conflict with section 4-402. If there is no evidence to establish a fact,
obviously there can be no question for the trier of fact.
Likewise, the proximate cause issue was treated as a matter of law in
Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims. 164 The court reversed an award of damages
for mental pain and suffering, stating that "[f]rom the proximate cause
standpoint, these nebulous items of damage bore no reasonable relation-
ship to the dishonor .... ,"165 Although the court discussed proximate
cause, the decision was based primarily on previous holdings that did not
allow recovery for mental pain and suffering unless the facts warranted
punitive damages. The Sims decision conflicts with the provision in section
4-402 identifying proximate cause as a question of fact. The decision not to
allow recovery for mental pain and suffering unless punitive damages are
warranted, to some extent based on a lack of proximate cause, was essen-
tially a policy decision. This was a proper use of proximate cause.1 66
Proximate cause is properly a question of law when the court must decide,
as a matter of policy, the extent of legal liability.1 67
3. Other Proximate Cause Problems
Even though proximate cause was not specifically discussed in the
opinions, two cases involving cancelled life insurance policies present prox-
imate cause issues. In Roe v. Best 168 the depositor's life insurance policy was
forfeited by the insurance company following the wrongful dishonor of the
depositor's check for payment of the policy premiums. There was evidence
that bank employees knew the check was payable to the insurance com-
pany, and the court stated that "it is a matter of common knowledge that
the failure to pay premiums on insurance policies will cause forfeiture
thereof.''169 Therefore, the court found that
the evidence . . . raised the issue of whether the bank. . . knew,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the
dishonor of the premium check would naturally or probably re-
sult in the forfeiture of the insurance contracts.170
In Wahrman v. Bronx County Trust Co. 17 the court stated that recovery
could not be had for damages resulting from the cancellation of an insur-
ance policy following a wrongful dishonor unless the depositor
[establishes] that the defendant had actual or constructive know-
ledge of the consequences reasonably to be expected from the
164. 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).
165. Id. at 58.
166. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
167. Id. § 42.
168. 120 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938).
169. Id. at 822.
170. Id.
171. 246 App. Div. 220, 285 N.Y.S. 312 (1936).
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non-payment of the check. Such knowledge cannot be inferred
merely from the fact that the check was payable to an insurance
company.' 72
To some extent, the decisions in Roe and Wahrman are inconsistent.
Under Roe, cancellation of an insurance policy would be reasonably
foreseeable and thus proximately caused by wrongful dishonor of a pre-
mium check, if employees of the bank knew that the check was payable to
an insurance company. In Wahrman there was no evidence that bank
employees knew the check was payable to an insurance company. However,
cancellation of an insurance policy was held not reasonably foreseeable,
and thus not proximately caused by wrongful dishonor, merely on the basis
that the check was payable to an insurance company.
No policy reasons can be discerned from these cases for refusing to
allow recovery of damages for the cancellation of an insurance policy
resulting from the wrongful dishonor of a premium check. The loss result-
ing from cancellation should be held to be reasonably foreseeable, and thus
proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor, whenever the bank knows
or should have known that the check was given in payment of insurance
premiums.
In Abramowitz v. Bank of America' 73 the bank wrongfully dishonored a
check which had been given in payment of a monthly installment on a
conditional sales contract for the purchase of an automobile. As a result of
the wrongful dishonor, the automobile was repossessed by the conditional
vendor. The court held that the loss of the automobile was proximately
caused by the wrongful dishonor, stating: "[I]t is difficult to conceive of a
situation wherein a loss could be sustained more directly related to the
dishonor of a check than that sustained by plaintiff here."174
The approach to proximate cause in Abramowitz is considerably less
stringent than that used by the courts in Roe and Wahrman. No foreseeabil-
ity requirement was imposed in Abramowitz; all that was required was a
direct relationship between the wrongful dishonor and the loss. Except for
cases involving arrest as the result of a wrongful dishonor, there are not
enough decisions to predict what will be the nature of a generally accepted
test to determine whether a loss was proximately caused by a wrongful
dishonor.
D. Punitive Damages
Section 4-402 of the U.C.C. does not provide for punitive damages for
wrongful dishonor. However, except for dishonors resulting from mistake,
the section does not specifically exclude an award for punitive damages. It
is necessary to go beyond section 4-402 to determine whether punitive
damages are recoverable for wrongful dishonor.
172. Id. at 221, 285 N.Y.S. at 313.
173. 131 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 892, 281 P.2d 380 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1955).
174. Id. at 897, 281 P.2d at 384.
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Under the General Provisions of the U.C.C., section 1-106 provides:
"iN]either consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except
as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law." Since punitive
damages for wrongful dishonor are not authorized by the U.C.C., the
possibility of recovery of punitive damages depends on other rules of law.
In Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank'75 the court held that the
evidence was insufficient to present a jury question on the claim for
punitive damages. However, the court did set out the circumstances under
which an award of punitive damages for wrongful dishonor would be
appropriate:
The last question . . . concerns the claim for punitive dam-
ages. . . .Punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded only
when the conduct of the wrongdoer may be said to be maliciously
intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly or
with a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
Malice as a basis for punitive damages means the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. This means
that the defendant not only intended to do the act which is
ascertained to be wrongful, but that he knew it was wrong when
he did it. 176
Similarly, in Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims177 the court suggested that
punitive damages for wrongful dishonor would be justified if the acts of
the bank had been willful or malicious.
An award of exemplary damages was upheld in Northshore Bank v,
Palmer.178 In Palmer the jury was instructed "that punitive damages may be
recovered only where there has been oppressive conduct or a reckless or
malicious disregard of the rights of another. . . ."' The facts in Palmer
provide an indication of what courts are likely to consider oppressive,
reckless, or malicious:
The checks written by Palmer. . .had already been paid by the
Bank, when the situation with respect to the forgery became
known to it. The officer in charge immediately charged Palmer's
account with the forged check despite his protestations that his
endorsement was a forgery. When he went to see the bank officer
to deny endorsement and receipt of the proceeds of the forged
check, the officer called over a uniformed guard. Even though the
checks had been cleared for payment and were covered by suffi-
cient funds when presented, the Bank recalled them and returned
them marked "paid in error" or "account closed". Palmer im-
mediately reported the forgery to the police . . . .He then
underwent the embarrassment of calling on each of the payees of
175. 76 N.M. 735, 746, 418 P.2d 191, 199 (1966).
176. Id. (citations omitted); accord, Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California
Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848, 854-55 (1975).
177. 435 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1968).
178. 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
179. Id. at 720.
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the dishonored checks. The Bank never relented. They charged
appellee $5 for each check they considered drawn on "insufficient
funds". Additionally, after all of the claims of Palmer were known
to the Bank officer having charge of the matter, the Bank placed
the claimed balance due in the hands of a collection agency, where
it rests today. The Bank never has paid Palmer the $275 which
under the jury's findings is wrongfully charged to his account.18 0
Relying on a statute similar to the A.B.A. model statute, the bank in
Jones v. Citizens Bank' argued that an instruction authorizing exemplary
damages should not have been given by the trial court. The court found
the evidence sufficient to establish malice and held that the statute was not
applicable where the dishonor was malicious. Thus, it was proper for the
trial court to submit the issue of exemplary damages to the jury. In Woody
v. National Bank,"8 2 a case decided under a statute similar to the A.B.A.
model statute, the court stated that punitive damages could be awarded if
the bank's act was determined by the jury to be "willful, malicious, wanton
and oppressive."
In Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Silver Saver Stores, Inc., 18 a
decision not involving a statute, the court approved an instruction au-
thorizing the jury to award punitive damages if it determined that the
checks were willfully dishonored. The court also stated that the evidence
was sufficient for the jury to find that the bank's acts were willful or
oppressive. Where a dishonor is willful and malicious, the depositor is
entitled to recover exemplary damages.8 4 If the dishonor results from
gross negligence which "evinces a conscious disregard of the rights of
others," exemplary damages also may be awarded.18 1 Instructions permit-
ting the jury to award punitive damages have been held erroneous where
there was no evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression.1 6 These rulings
imply, however, that punitive damages can be awarded under proper
circumstances. In those jurisdictions which allow punitive damages,18 7 the
authorities support a conclusion that punitive damages may be recovered
for malicious dishonors.
E. Mitigation of Damages
When a dishonor results from mistake or error on the part of the
bank, the extent of injury to the depositor's credit may be less than such
injury if the dishonor had resulted from insufficient funds in the de-
180. Id. at 721.
181. 58 N.M. 48, 265 P.2d 366 (1954).
182. 194 N.G. 549, 557, 140 S.E. 150, 155 (1927).
183. 166 Miss. 882, 891, 148 So. 367, 369 (1933).
184. Wood v. American Nat'l Bank, 100 Va. 306, 312, 40 S.E. 931, 933 (1902).
185. Id. at 312, 40 S.E. at 934.
186. Winkler v. Citizens' State Bank, 89 Kan. 279, 131 P. 597 (1913); American
Nat'l Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 863, 69 S.W. 759, 760 (1902); Pascagoula Nat'l
Bank v. Eberlein, 161 Miss. 337, 344, 131 So. 812, 814 (1931).
187. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973).
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positor's account."' The amount of damages resulting from mistaken
dishonor may be reduced where the bank offers to write letters explaining
the error.18 9 However, the depositor is under no duty to request that the
bank explain the error to persons receiving notice of the dishonor; the
bank should know that this method of mitigating damages is available to
it. 19
0
In a situation involving a bank error, damages may be mitigated where
the persons learning of the dishonor are readily available to the depositor
for explanation of the circumstances causing the dishonor. 9' Damages also
may be reduced if the checks are paid on a second presentment following
dishonor on the first presentment. 92
The fact that the bank properly returned a number of the depositor's
checks because of insufficient funds prior to the wrongful dishonor may be
a mitigating circumstance. Where checks of a depositor are repeatedly and
properly returned because of insufficient funds, a subsequent wrongful
dishonor of that depositor's check may cause little injury to his credit." 3
V. WHO MAY RECOVER DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISHONOR
Section 4-402 of the U.C.C. provides in part: "A payor bank is liable to
its customer for damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of
an item." A person who has a checking account with a bank is a customer of
the bank. 9 4 When the customer draws a check against his account, the
bank is a payor bank as to that check.' 95 Thus, the customer who has a
checking account in a bank may recover damages under this section if the
bank wrongfully dishonors his check.
In some circumstances, it may be difficult to determine who is the
188. Gonzales v. Colonial Trust Co., 7 Misc. 2d 508, 162 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct.
1957), aff'd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 679, 174 N.Y.S.2d 444, appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d
779, 154 N.E.2d 559, 180 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1958); accord, Spearing v. Whitney-Central
Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 615, 56 So. 548, 551 (1911).
189. Weaver v. Grenada Bank, 180 Miss. 876, 179 So. 564 (1938).
190. Gonzales v. Colonial Trust Co., 7 Misc. 2d 508, 162 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct.
1957), aff'd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 679, 174 N.Y.S. 2d 444, appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d
779, 154 N.E.2d 559, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 300 (1958).
191. Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
192. Gonzales v. Colonial Trust Co., 7 Misc. 2d 508, 162 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct.
1957), aff'd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 679, 174 N.Y.S.2d 444, appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d
779, 154 N.E.2d 559, 180 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1958).
193. See Love v. Tioga Trust Co., 68 Pa. Super. 447, 451 (1917). See also
Gonzales v. Colonial Trust Co., 7 Misc. 2d 508, 162 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1957),
aff'd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 679, 174 N.Y.S.2d 444, appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 779,
154 N.E.2d 559, 180 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1958).
194. The definition of customer is set out in § 4-104(1)(e) of the U.C.C.:
"Customer" means any person having an account with a bank or for whom
a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carrying an account
with another bank; ....
195. Payor bank is defined in § 4-105(b) of the U.C.C.: "'Payor bank' means a
bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted; .... .
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customer of a bank. In Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank196 a partnership
and the individual partners sought to recover damages for the wrongful
dishonor of partnership checks. The checking account was in the name of
the partnership and required the signatures of both partners for checks
drawn on the account. One of the questions considered by the court was
whether the individual partners were customers of the bank under section
4-402. Relying on the U.C.C.'s definitions of person 197 and organization,
198
the court concluded that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code expressly re-
gards a partnership as a legal entity." '99 Bolstering this conclusion by other
instances where partnerships are considered to be legal entities, the court
decided that only the partnership was a customer of the bank. Hence, the
individual partners could not recover damages for wrongful dishonor since
they were not customers of the bank.2 °0
Although the U.C.C. recognizes that a partnership may be a legal
entity, it does not require that a partnership be treated as an entity in every
situation. The language of the Code does not absolutely preclude the
partners from being customers of the bank. The credit standing of indi-
vidual partners could be injured by the dishonor of partnership checks,
particularly if the partners are legally liable for partnership obligations.
Therefore, the likelihood of injury to the credit of the partners should be a
factor considered by the courts in determining whether partners are cus-
tomers under section 4-402. If the partnership account is carried in the
names of the individual partners, they then would be customers of the
bank within the meaning of section 4-402.
In Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank201 the court refused to
follow the narrow interpretation of the term "customer" that was adopted
by the court in Loucks. The Kendalls were officers and prospective princi-
pal shareholders of a corporation which had never issued stock and which
was undercapitalized. "[I]t was, in effect, nothing but a transparent shell,
having no viability as a separate and distinct legal entity." 2 2 Because of this
situation, the Kendalls personally guaranteed corporate obligations to the
bank. They controlled the corporation's financial affairs and vouched for
its fiscal responsibility. The bank and other corporate creditors were well
aware of the situation. Therefore, the bank knew that the dishonor of
corporate checks could injure the credit and reputation of the Kendalls. In
these circumstances, the Kendalls were found to be "customers" of the
196. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
197. Under § 1-201(30) of the U.C.C., "'Person' includes an individual or an
organization ......
198. "'Organization' includes a corporation, government or governmental sub-
division or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or
more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial
entity." U.C.C. § 1-201(28).
199. 76 N.M. at 742, 418 P.2d at 196.
200. Id. at 744, 418 P.2d at 196-97.
201. 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975).
202. Id. at 956, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
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bank under section 4-402 and entitled to recover for the wrongful dishon-
or of corporate checks.
In Macrum v. Security Trust & Savings Co.,203 a pre-U.C.C. case, the
manager of a company sought to recover damages for injury to his person-
al credit and reputation resulting from the wrongful dishonor of a check
drawn by him on the account of the company. Because of the wrongful
dishonor, he had been arrested and confined in jail. The bank argued that
there was no breach of duty to the manager; that the only duty owed by the
bank was to the company. The court acknowledged that the manager was
not a party to the contract between the company and the bank and that the
manager would not have an action for breach of the contract, but con-
cluded that the bank owed to the manager a duty arising from the contract
to honor checks properly drawn by the manager. The court reasoned that
the bank should have known that some injury to the manager might result
from the wrongful dishonor of a check drawn by him.20 4 On rehearing, the
court further supported its decision by pointing out that wrongful dishon-
or tends to slander the drawer of the check in his trade or business and
imputes insolvency, dishonesty, or bad faith. Hence, the wrongful dishonor
of the check indicated that the manager, in his individual capacity, acted
dishonestly or in bad faith.20 5
Under the U.C.C., an organization with an account at a bank is a
customer of that bank.2 6 It could be argued that, as to the account of the
organization, an officer of an organization would not be a customer of the
bank because he has no account. Because section 4-402 provides for liabili-
ty of the bank only to its customer, the officer of an organization arguably
would have no right to recover damages for the wrongful dishonor of a
check drawn by him on the account of the organization. °7 However, as the
Kendall Yacht Corp. and Macrum cases demonstrate, the officer may be
injured by the wrongful dishonor of an organization check drawn by him.
The organization officer should not be denied relief under section 4-402.
Since an organization acts only through its officers, it is reasonable to hold
203. 221 Ala. 419, 129 So. 74 (1930).
204. Id. at 422, 129 So. at 76.
205. Id. at 423, 129 So. at 77-78.
206. "'Customer' means any person having an account with a bank ... "
U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(e). "'Person' includes ... an organization .... ." Id. § 1-
201(30); Farmers Bank v. Sinwellan Corp., 367 A.2d 180, 183 (Del. 1976).
207. Farmers Bank v. Sinwellan Corp., 367 A.2d 180, 183 (Del. 1976). The
opinion of the superior court demonstrates the weakness of the reasoning by the
supreme court. Sinwellan Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 345 A.2d 430 (Del. Super. Ct.
1975), rev'd, 367 A.2d 180 (Del. 1976). The superior court held that one of the
officers was a customer of the bank. He established the account for the corporation
and designated authorized drawers for the account. In addition, a criminal action
was commenced against him as a result of the wrongful dishonors, bringing publici-
ty and expense to him. The other officer did not participate in establishing the
account; nor was she subjected to criminal liability. Thus according to the superior
court, she was not a customer under § 4-402.
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that the bank owes a duty to the officers of the organization as well as to the
organization itself. It also is reasonable to impose liability on the bank for
injuries sustained by the officer as a result of the wrongful dishonor.
Accordingly, the term "customer" in section 4-402 should be interpreted
broadly to include the officers of organizations who draw checks that are
wrongfully dishonored.
The situation in De Launay v. Union National Bank218 raises another
question concerning the right to recover damages for wrongful dishonor.
The depositor was treasurer of a church, and church funds apparently
were carried in his name as treasurer. The bank dishonored a check drawn
by the treasurer. The bank argued that the treasurer was not entitled to
damages because his personal credit was not injured by the dishonor.
Rejecting this argument, the court stated:
A fiduciary is supposed to be more particular with the trust funds
than with his own, and his laxity in reference to them is corre-
spondingly a greater reflection, not only upon his credit, but upon
his business methods and the scrupulous care which he should
exercise.2
0 9
When funds are carried in the account of a depositor as trustee or agent,
the trustee or agent is the customer of the bank. Therefore, the trustee or
agent should have a right to recover damages under section 4-402 for the
wrongful dishonor of his check if he can establish injury resulting from the
wrongful dishonor.
VI. CONCLUSION
The first step in analyzing a refusal to honor a check is to determine
whether the refusal constitutes dishonor. Refusal to honor a check for the
reason that it is not in proper form does not constitute dishonor. Dishonor
usually does occur, however, when payment of a proper order is refused.
After determining that a dishonor has occurred, the next step is to consider
whether the dishonor was wrongful. The primary reason for dishonor is
the lack of sufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. When the
drawer's account is in fact insufficient, dishonor is not wrongful. However,
the account balance shown on the books of the bank is frequently incorrect
due to clerical errors made by the bank. Dishonor resulting from a clerical
error is wrongful. Wrongful dishonor also frequently occurs after the bank
has made an improper setoff against the customer's account.
A large majority of the legal issues arising from wrongful dishonors
center around determining the nature and extent of damages to be award-
ed. The most difficult problem is the determination of the proper measure
of damages for mistaken wrongful dishonors. This problem exists because
the attempt in section 4-402 of the U.C.C. to eliminate the presumption of
substantial damages for mistaken wrongful dishonors does not distinguish
208. 116 S.C. 215, 107 S.E. 925 (1921).
209. Id. at 216, 107 S.E. at 925.
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between proof of injury and proof of amount of damages. The drafters
sought to eliminate the presumption by limiting liability to actual damages
proved. Certainly this limitation on liability means that there should be no
presumption of injury from wrongful dishonor; the customer must estab-
lish some injury to prove actual damages. The question remains, however,
whether this limitation also means that the customer must establish with a
high degree of certainty a specific dollar amount of damages which was
caused by the injury. Such a stringent proof requirement would lead to no
recovery in a large majority of the cases. Therefore, proof of injury should
be sufficient to satisfy the actual damage limitation of section 4-402, leaving
the assessment of a reasonable amount of damages to the trier of fact.
Preferably, the section should be redrafted to preclude a presumption of
injury in mistaken dishonor cases.
